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Analogies between cases with matching sets of connected relational structure is well-
explained by existing theory. Re-representation is posited as an important mechanism to
increase the flexibility of analogical processing by allowing the alignment of non-identical
predicates across compared cases. It has been proposed that certain kind of categories
can be characterized in terms of the relational structure that its exemplars tend to
satisfy. Such relational categories have the property that all members of the category
are analogous to one another. We ask whether a process of re-representation can alter
the construal of a case and bring two evidently non-analogous cases into analogical
alignment if they are both seen as members of the same relational category. We examine
analogies between pairs of cases where the base is a canonical example of a relational
category and the target would not be considered a member of the category on its
own – critically, the cases themselves share no evident relational identities or similarities.
In Experiment 1, we ask whether presenting a target case as part of an analogical
pairing alters its construal. In Experiment 2, the pairs are presented for judgment as
potential analogies. In both studies, participants interpret the target cases differently
(consistent with the relational category) as a result of processing the analogy. There are
two main implications: (1) a form of re-representation is at work in which the activation
of a relational category triggers an alternate construal of the target case; and (2) this
suggests a path to analogical status for cases that lack relational identities or similarities
if the cases can both be fit to the same relational category.
Keywords: analogy, mapping, re-representation, relational category, similarity
INTRODUCTION
In Argentine film “El fútbol o yo” (“Soccer or me”), Pedro Pintos is a fan of any the team or
league – he watches soccer at home, at social gatherings and even at work. His passion for soccer
dates from his childhood days and seemingly fits harmoniously with the rest of his life. However,
his obsession starts to get out of control. Suddenly, Pedro finds himself separated from his wife
and fired from his job due to his excessive commitment to watching soccer. Deep in misery, he
finally realizes that his need for soccer is an addiction just like the abuse of alcohol. This insight
leads him to look for help just as an alcoholic might do. This novel conceptualization of watching
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soccer as an addiction demonstrates a case of analogical re-
representation. This re-representation serves as a precondition
for Pedro matching his passion for soccer and his knowledge of
alcohol dependency; and the analogical mapping provides a basis
for further understanding and inference (e.g., the consequences
of the addiction and how to deal with them). As this example
illustrates, re-representation can allow unlikely matches and lead
to novel interpretations that overcome previous ones (Gentner
and Wol , 2000; Kurtz, 2005).
Analogizing watching soccer to drinking alcohol requires
accepting a similarity between two facts whose corresponding
relations (represented by the verbs “watch” and “drink”) are
fundamentally dissimilar actions that could only be considered
similar at a ludicrously abstract level (“things people do”).
Theoretical approaches to analogical re-representation like the
widely held and broadly supported structure-mapping theory
(Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Gentner, 1989), appear limited in
their ability to explain analogies of this type. The di culty arises
from the requirement for some level of identical match between
corresponding relations in order to accept two situations as
analogous – on this view re-representation provides the basis for
discovering or revealing such identical content while carrying out
an alignment process between cases. In the present research, we
propose an alternate path in which analogical re-representation
takes place by transferring a relational category (e.g., addiction)
that is readily activated by a base analog (e.g., abusive drinking
of alcohol) but not readily activated by the target case (e.g.,
abusive watching of soccer). In other words, the soccer watching
is highly unlikely to be seen as an example of addiction on its own,
but when comparing soccer watching and drinking alcohol, an
analogy is built not from any direct similarity between watching
and drinking, but from the clear categorization of drinking
alcohol as an example of addiction and the newly compelling
re-representation of soccer watching as a viable member of
the same relational category (addiction). We have carried out
two experiments to evaluate the operation of a mechanism that
operates on the meaning of propositions taken as wholes, so that
the cognitive system identifies two situations as analogous on
the basis of common relational category membership rather than
finding an identity between dissimilar local relations.
Re-representation in Structure-Mapping
Theory
The structure-mapping theory of analogical reasoning states that
forming an analogy consists of recognizing that two situations
share a common structure of identical relations regardless of
whether the corresponding entities are alike (Gentner, 1983,
1989, 2010; Gentner and Markman, 1997, 2006). In terms of
propositional representations, relations are represented by multi-
place predicates and entity attributes are represented by one-
place predicates. Considering relatively simple cases, a situation
like John pushed the box of books would be considered analogous
to the situation Mary pushed the wheelchair because both are
based on the same relation (an action represented by the verb
push) while the entities filling the roles of agent (John vs. Mary)
and object (box of books vs. wheelchair) di er. The theory is
robust and predicts a wide range of psychological data. One
facet of the explanatory framework that remains something of
a frontier is re-representation (e.g., Day and Asmuth, 2017): the
process of revealing semantic similarities between relations that
are neither identical nor synonymous.
According to structure-mapping theory, two non-identical
relations can be placed in correspondence either via minimal
ascension (i.e., searching for their least abstract common
superordinate; Falkenhainer, 1990) or semantic decomposition
(i.e., breaking down the meaning of the paired relations into their
semantic subcomponents; e.g., Yan et al., 2003). To continue the
example above, John pushed the box of books could be considered
analogous to the situation Mary guided the wheelchair, even
though push is neither lexically identical nor synonymous to
guide. In this case push and guide might be re-represented as
two instances of causing directed change to an object’s position.
Gentner and Kurtz (2006) found that semantically related verbs
were commonly judged as analogous and required additional
processing time – which was presumed to reflect the operation
of a re-representation process.
Re-representation Operating at the Level
of Schema-Governed Categories
As noted, the structure-mapping theory requirement for
alignment is that two relations are either identical or
synonymous; or that re-representation operates to specify
some form of direct semantic match. Along these lines, Gentner
and Kurtz (2006) found a pattern of fast rejections (item pairs
judged non-analogous) for verbs that were clearly unrelated.
However, Minervino et al. (2008, 2013) have postulated that
an element of similarity between relations may not always be
necessary for two situations to be analogous: two situations
with dissimilar relations can be considered analogous if they
are instances of the same schema-governed relational category.
Schema-governed categories (Markman and Stilwell, 2001;
Gentner and Kurtz, 2005) are relational categories that specify
the structure of situations or events in terms of a network of
semantic interdependencies that hold among the constituents of
the concept in question. As an example, the schema-governed
category physical aggression tends to involve (a) an intentional
agent, (b) a physical action exert by the agent, and (c) a patient
sensitive to pain. This network not only includes several variables
and constrains the types of entities or actions that may be bound
to each of the variables in the schema, but it also stipulates how
the values assigned to a variable constrain the values that can
be bound to other variables. Following the example of physical
aggression, if the object of the physical action is the hair, then
a suitable action could be to pull; whereas if the target of the
action is a finger, then a suitable action could be to twist. As these
examples illustrate, various exemplars of a schema-governed
category need not involve similar relations.
Minervino et al. (2008, 2013) studied sentence pairs such as
Sammy bought a perfume for a girl in his class and Sammy wrote
a poem to a girl in his class. The verbs are semantically distant
and seemingly not a candidate for traditional re-representation,
yet these pairs are usually judged to be analogous. One could
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imagine analogies across unrelated verbs as a result of idiomatic
language (e.g., hit the hay vs. go to sleep), but the verbs used
by Minervino et al. (2008, 2013) followed their literal meaning.
The pairs were designed to include dissimilar verbs, but with
both situations being members of the same relational category
(in this case: acts of romantic courtship). As both cases activate
the same schema-governed category, the events are seen as
analogous despite the relations lacking similarity at the local level.
Specifically, the buying of perfume and writing of a poem are
both construed as situations in which (a) the agent intends to
show generosity of spirit (b) the patient is capable of experiencing
romantic emotions, and (c) the object is pleasant for the
patient. The common semantic structure that derives from the
interdependency between the verbs (buy, write) – which have
no common basis between them – and the objects (perfume,
poem) serves to activate a common schema-governed category
and thereby drive analogical acceptance.
While comparisons of this kind do not require re-representing
the analogs (each situation of the pair leads to the activation
of the common schema-governed category independently from
the other one), it is possible to envision cases where the target
situation is not naturally represented as an instance of the
schema-governed category to which the base situation belongs,
but that might be re-represented as such due to taking part in
analogical comparison with the base. Elaborating on the previous
example, could a target situation like Sammy played a joke to a
girl in his class become viewed as an act of romantic courtship
through an analogical comparison with a base analog like Sammy
bought a perfume for a girl in his class? The representational
change in this case would involve assessing whether the target
situation satisfies the semantic structure of the relational category
activated by the base analog. For example, generosity of spirit may
be realized through good-natured joking and the pleasantness of
the object may be realized by some property (e.g., incongruence)
of the joke to cause laughter. The analogy to the base only
becomes apparent as the construal of the target in terms of a
common relational category is realized.
The present goal is to build upon the findings of Minervino
et al.’s (2013) that compared situations can become “analogies
without commonalities” if both are canonical members of the
same relational category. In the current experiments, we make
one key shift to extend beyond existing work: instead of
presenting two canonical cases of the relational category, we
present pairs that consist of one canonical case and one target
case where the latter is generally not seen as a member of the
category on its own (but may be subject to re-categorization).
Further, we now employ self-reported construal of the target case
as the dependent measure (rather than analogical acceptance).
Analogy constitutes an instrument to detect that two initially
mismatching relational predicates are similar (Gentner and
Wol , 2000), to highlight relational commonalities by creating
a focus on a subset of relevant information (Kurtz et al., 2013)
or to generate new information that can prove valid for the
target (Blanchette and Dunbar, 2002). However, most of these
re-representational mechanisms have been conceived as methods
for discovering the intersection between base and target relations
that were all there to begin with. In line with the idea that
some metaphors cannot only discover but also create similarities
(see, e.g., Indurkhya, 1992), in the present study we set forth to
document an analogical mechanism capable of eliciting a novel
perception of the target that cannot be conceived merely as
resulting from drawing our attention to preexisting information
in the target, but one that supposes an alteration of our initial
conceptualization of the target. While in Experiment 1 the base-
target pairs are explicitly introduced as constituting an analogy,
in a follow-up study we presented the base-target pairs for
analogical evaluation prior to eliciting a description of the target
case. In this way we were able to assess whether the predicted
e ect emerges from natural comparison or whether it requires an
explicit framing of the two cases as analogically related.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants in the analogy group read a canonical example of a
schema-governed category followed by a non-canonical example
of such category. Their task on each trial was to describe the
situation of the target given that it was analogous to the base.
Participants in the no-analogy group received the target case
after reading a non-related situation and were asked to describe
the target. The descriptions of the target case were analyzed to
determine the extent to which participants in both groups applied
the relational category corresponding to the base analog of the
experimental condition.
Methods
Participants
Sixty undergraduate students from the Comahue University
participated in the experiment for course credit. Participants
were randomly assigned to form even-sized groups experiencing
the analogical condition and non-analogical conditions. All
subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure and Materials
Participants in the analogical condition read a definition of
analogy accompanied by two examples (see Table 1). The general
instruction for the task stated that they would receive several
pairs of analogous situations, with the task of providing one
description of the second situation of each pair. After reading this
instruction, participants received a booklet containing six critical
trials randomly interleaved with six filler trials. Each critical trial
presented a situation that would normally be categorized as being
an exemplar of certain schema-governed category (e.g., hanging
garlic on the door as a case of superstitious behavior) followed by
a second situation that – despite being a possible exemplar of that
category – would not be spontaneously categorized as such (e.g.,
lighting a candle in the basement; the full set of critical materials
is presented in Table 2).
Beneath each pair of sentences a prompt was provided
that asked participants to write a description of the second
situation under the assumption that it was analogous to
the first: “How would you describe the second situation
considering that it is analogous to the first one?” The
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2441
fpsyg-09-02441 December 6, 2018 Time: 14:46 # 4
Oberholzer et al. Rerepresentation in Analogical Thinking
inclusion of filler sets served to discourage participants from
inferring that all cases could be resolved by applying the
categorization of the base analog to the target. Toward this
end, the structure of the filler sets was the opposite of the
critical ones: while the second situation was chosen to be
spontaneously categorized in terms of the critical schema-
governed category, the former one pertained to the category but
TABLE 1 | Instructions given to participants Experiment 1.
Analogical condition Non-analogical condition
Definition of analogy
"Two things are analogous when they
are similar in essential respects but
differ in superficial aspects".
———-
Examples provided
"Example 1: Peter kicked Susan’s ankle
is analogous to Jeff pulled Tom’s hair.
Example 2. Larry rented a house is
analogous to Larry bought a yacht"
General instruction
"You will receive several pairs of
analogous situations. For each pair, you
will have to provide a description of the
second situation".
General instruction"You will receive
several pairs of situations. For each
pair, you will have to provide a
description of the second situation".
Example of a critical trial: Example of a critical trial:
"Situation1: john gave a perfume to
María.
"Situation 1: John lodged a complaint
on María.
Situation 2: john played a joke on María. Situation 2: john played a joke on María.
How would you describe the second
situation considering that it is
analogous to the first one?"
How would you describe the second
situation?"
would not be spontaneously categorized as an exemplar of it.
All trials (critical or filler) involved di erent schema-governed
categories.
The overall instruction for participants in the non-analogical
condition stated that they would receive several pairs of situations,
with the task of providing a description for the second situation
of each pair. After reading this instruction, participants received a
booklet containing the same 12 target analogs as in the analogical
condition, but they were preceded by a non-exemplar of the
critical category. Each base non-analog involved a di erent
schema-governed category. Beneath each pair of sentences
a prompt was provided that asked participants to write a
description of the second situation: “How would you describe
the second situation.” The order of presentation of the critical
and filler trials was counterbalanced across conditions. The
experiment was individually administrated by computer in an
experimental session that lasted approximately 30 min.
A preliminary study was conducted in order to select
appropriate materials. After constructing 33 candidate sets each
comprised of a canonical, a marginal, and a non-exemplar of a
schema-governed category, the 99 situations were presented in
randomized order to an independent group of 27 participants
who were asked to produce descriptions of each situation.
We selected 12 sets of materials for which: (1) the canonical
exemplars were cases for which more than 60% of participants
used the critical category to describe the situation; (2) the
marginal exemplars were cases in which less than 15% of
participants used the critical category to describe the situation;
and (3) the non-analogs were situations for which none of the
participants applied the critical category. Accordingly, it was
clearly established in advance that the target analog had a low
TABLE 2 | Critical sets of materials Experiments 1 and 2.
Category Exemplar type Specific situation
Romantic courtship Canonical Juan gave a perfume to María (Juan le regaló un perfume a María)
Non-canonical Juan played a joke on María (Juan le hizo una broma a María)
Non-analog Juan lodged a complaint against María (Juan le presentó una demanda a María)
Marital infidelity Canonical Ariel closed the chat when his wife arrived (Ariel cerró el chat cuando entró su mujer)
Non-canonical Ariel made the bed when his wife arrived (Ariel arregló la cama cuando entró su mujer)
Non-analog Ariel blew his nose when his wife arrived (Ariel se sonó la nariz cuando entró su mujer)
Superstition Canonical Dolores hung garlic on the house door (Dolores colocó ajos en la puerta de la casa)
Non-canonical Dolores lit a candle in the basement (Dolores prendió una vela en el sótano)
Non-analog Dolores forgot a jacket in the backyard (Dolores se olvidó la campera en el jardín de su casa)
Cooling off Canonical Fernando took off his t-shirt after cycling several kilometers (Fernando se quitó la remera después de bicicletear unos
kilómetros)
Non-canonical Fernando entered a mall after exiting the subway (Fernando entró en un shopping después de salir del subterráneo)
Non-analog Fernando stayed overtime after completing his shift (Fernando hizo horas extra después de cumplir su turno)
Job seeking Canonical Vanina sent her CV to a job agency (Vanina envió su curriculum a una consultora)
Non-canonical Vanina read the newspaper in the bar (Vanina leyó el diario en el bar)
Non-analog Vanina spent the whole afternoon seeking the keys (Vanina estuvo buscando las llaves toda la tarde)
Competition Canonical Marcos challenged his classmates about who got the best grades in the quiz (Marcos desafió a sus compañeros a ver
quién tenía mejor nota en el parcial)
Non-canonical Marcos queried his colleagues about their cars before buying his own car (Marcos preguntó a sus colegas qué auto
tenían antes de comprar el suyo)
Non-analog Marcos gave his son a large collection of cigarette packets (Marcos regaló a su hijo su amplia colección de paquetes de
cigarrillos)
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probability of being initially represented as an example of the
critical category of the base.
Data Analysis
Two independent judges received each participant’s descriptions
of the target analogs coupled with its critical corresponding
schema-governed category, and had to decide in which cases the
description corresponded to such category. They were instructed
to consider as hits only those cases in which the exact critical
concept or a very close synonymwas employed (e.g.,witchcraft or
ritual instead of superstition). Judges agreed in 86% of the cases,
and solved cases of disagreement by discussion.
Results and Discussion
On average, participants in the no-analogy group used the critical
category in 5.7% of the trials. In contrast to this low proportion,
participants in the analogical group used the critical category to
refer to the target analogs in 52.14% of the trials. This di erence
between groups was significant, M = 0.5214, SD = 0.1993 vs.
M = 0.057, SD = 0.0801, t(50.23) = 13.473, p< 0.001.
Despite the dramatic increase in the proportion of these
hitherto unlikely categorizations of the target analogs, a
limitation in the generalizability of this result is the fact that
participants were asked to describe the second situation under
the assumption that it was analogous to the first. Even though
this external pressure to consider two situations as analogous
is representative of the use of analogy in a myriad of everyday
activities such as persuasion, explanation, or instruction, there
are other circumstances in which a prompt to compare two
situations does not explicitly favor the acceptance of their
analogical relatedness. In order to assess whether the results of
Experiment 1 generalize to less directive contexts, we introduced
a variation that allowed for evaluation of a spontaneous
analogical categorization instead of a forced one.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment we introduced the use of a yes-no question
regarding the analogical relation between the two presented
situations prior to the categorization task. That is, participants
read two situations and were asked whether they regarded
them as analogous. Following a within-subjects design, unlike
Experiment 1, all participants were shown analogy and non-
analogy item types with the number of expected “yes” and
“no” answers balanced. After making the analogical acceptance
judgment, participants were asked to describe the second
situation. We assessed whether comparing the target to a base
analog (in contrast to a base non-analog) would increase the
proportion of cases in which the category that was naturally
applicable to the base analog of the analogical condition was used
to categorize the target situation.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-six undergraduate students from the Comahue University
participated in the experiment for course credit. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Procedure and Materials
Participants read a definition of analogy accompanied by an
example of an analogy and an example of a non-analogy (see
Table 3). They were informed that they would receive pairs
of situations with the task of determining whether they were
analogous or not (“Do you consider that these two situations are
analogous?”). Following that task they were asked: “Then, how
would you describe the second situation?”
We used the same materials as in Experiment 1. As all
participants were presented with analogies and non-analogies,
we were able to implement a within-subjects manipulation
of whether the critical target analogs were preceded by a
canonical exemplar of the category to which they belonged. Each
participant received three critical analogies, three critical non
analogies, three filler analogies and three filler non analogies. The
order of presentation of the sets was counterbalanced. For each
participant who received the critical analogy version of Set 1 (for
instance), another participant received the critical non-analogy
version of the same set.
Results and Discussion
Following the same criteria from Experiment 1, two independent
judges evaluated whether participants used the critical category
to describe the target analog. Judges agreed in 84% of the trials.
Cases of disagreement were solved by discussion. On average, in
the no-analogy condition participants used the critical category in
7.11% of the trials. Participants in the analogy condition accepted
the analogy in 69.44% of the trials. Closely following the pattern
seen in Experiment 1, participants who accepted the analogy used
the critical category to refer to the target analogs in 57.17% of
the trials. Once again this di erence was significant, M = 0.5717,
SD = 0.3464 vs.M = 0.0711, SD = 0.2029, t(34) = 8.134, p< 0.001.
TABLE 3 | Instructions given to participants Experiment 2.
Definition of analogy "Two things are analogous when they are similar in
essential respects but differ in superficial aspects".
Examples:
"Example of analogy: Peter kicked Susan’s ankle is analogous to Jeff pulled
Tom’s hair.
Example of non-analogy: Larry rented a house is not analogous to Jill ate a
candy".
General instruction
"You will receive several pairs of situations. For each pair, you will begin by
determining whether they are analogous or not. After this, you will be asked to
describe the second situation".
Example of a critical trial:
"Situation 1: John gave a perfume to María
Situation 2: John played a joke on María" (analogical condition)
or
"Situation 1: John lodged a complaint on María
Situation 2: John played a joke on María" (non-analogical condition)
Do you consider that these two situations are analogous? Yes–No.
Then, how would you describe the second situation?”
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Even though the majority of participants who answered “yes”
to the question of analogical relatedness invoked the critical
category, a non-negligible proportion of participants did not
invoke the critical category for characterizing the target situation.
An informal analysis of these descriptions showed that while in
13.81% of the cases participants seemed to have applied the target
category to the base (e.g., they categorized the target playing a
joke as a case of wanting to gladden her heart – a description
that seems also applicable to the base case of giving a perfume),
in 29.05% of the cases participants invoked a description that
encompassed both facts (e.g., “wanting to be friendly,” which
seems to be applicable to both giving a perfume and playing a
joke).
The results of Experiment 2 accord in a convincing manner
with those of Experiment 1. Given that in this second experiment
participants had the freedom to determine if the two situations
were analogous, these results allow us to dismiss the hypothesis
that the results obtained in our first experiment were due to
pressure exerted on participants to consider the two situations as
analogous.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Most theories of analogical mapping accept that two situations
can be considered analogous even when their corresponding
relations are not initially represented as having identical meaning
(Gentner and Kurtz, 2006). They require, however, that non-
identical relations can be re-represented in a way that at
least some common semantic aspects of the relations become
manifested. Standard re-representation mechanisms such as
superordination (Falkenhainer, 1990) and decomposition (Yan
et al., 2003) require that the meanings of the compared relations
remain unmodified when these relations are bound to their
respective arguments. To illustrate, as the meaning of rent
and borrow are preserved when applied, respectively, to house
and van, the preexisting, context-free similarity between these
relations is preserved.
We contended that although the standard approach to re-
representation can successfully cope with analogies in which the
nucleus of semantics lies at relations, it might fail to capture
alternative re-representation mechanisms that operate when
comparing propositional structures in which there is a strong
interdependency between the fillers that might instantiate the
di erent thematic roles of such structures. In the present study
we obtained evidence for a re-representation mechanism that
consists in projecting a schema-governed category (Markman
and Stilwell, 2001) from a canonical to a non-canonical exemplar
of such category.
It could be argued that the analogies included in our materials
do not require re-representation mechanisms any di erent from
those traditionally proposed. As the meaning of verbs can be
significantly altered as a function of the particular arguments to
which they are bound (Gentner and France, 1988; Kersten and
Earles, 2004), the concepts used as arguments in our base and
target relations could have activatated particular connotations
of such verbs, which happened to match (a contrapositive
version of this kind of hypothesis was posited by Gentner and
Kurtz (2006), to account for some anomalous cases in which
participants denied analogical relatedness to pairs of situations
whose relations maintained a clear semantic relatedness when
considered in isolation). However, this explanation does not seem
to hold for our materials, since the entities to which the verbs
are applied neither activate an alternative meaning of the verbs
themselves, nor do they promote an extended (e.g., metaphorical)
use of those verbs. Rather, they activate concepts whose meaning
are entirely di erent from the verbs on which they originate.
Taking as an example the analogy between hanging garlic from the
door and lighting a candle in the basement, the idea of superstition
is neither contained in the base relation hanging, nor in the target
relation lighting. Hence, the re-representation processes that were
at work during the processing of our target situations do not
reduce to highlighting a marginal semantic component common
to the base and target relations.
Dominant accounts of analogical mapping agree in allowing
the re-representation of two non-identical relations that are
concurrently active in working memory. However, there is some
debate as to whether candidate situations that are stored in
long-term memory (LTM) could be re-represented to match a
target situation currently active in working memory (Dietrich,
2000). While retrieval algorithms that rely on the identicality
of base and target predicates (e.g., MAC/FAC, Forbus et al.,
1995) allow re-representation of base situations once they have
been retrieved, the algorithms proposed by the multiconstraint
theory can probe LTM for situations containing non-identical
predicates either by means of minimal ascension along external
networks such as WordNet (ARCS, Thagard et al., 1990) or
else by decomposing predicates and entities into their semantic
primitives (LISA, Hummel and Holyoak, 1997). The results of the
present study suggest yet another way in which re-representation
may subserve analogical retreival, namely, by means of seeking
further exemplars of the schema-governed category to which the
target analog belongs. Upon a failure to evoke exemplars of the
target category of events (e.g., prior flitatious behavior of person
X toward person Y), a sensible retrieval strategy could consist
in (1) breaking down the relational structure of such category
into separable subcomponents (e.g., Person X’s manifestations
of interest in Person Y), (2) probing LTM for instances of
such component alone (e.g., Person X having played a joke on
Person Y), and (3) assessing whether the retrieved episode can be
ascribed to the “flirtatious behavior” relational category.
The present study has focused on how a dubious exemplar of
a schema-governed category can be categorized as belonging to
such category by way of comparing it to a more representative
exemplar. Given that exemplars of a schema-governed category
may display di erent values along critical dimensions of the
category at stake (Tavernini et al., 2017), a future line of research
could delve into whether an exemplar scoring low on a given
dimension of such category could be re-represented as a result
of being compared with an exemplar displaying higher values in
such dimension (e.g., analogizing between amultimillion robbery
a smaller one). Moreover, this kind of base situation need not
consist in real episodes. For those target situations for which we
cannot identify a known situation scoring higher (or lower) on
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the particular dimension that we want to emphasize, the ad hoc
fabrication of a suitable base analog seems a sensible way to go.
A naturalistic example of analogy fabrication in the service of re-
representation was reported by Tony Veale during Analogy09:
At a time when there was debate around whether public spaces
should have a separate sector for smokers vs. prohibit smoking
altogether, a bar displayed a sign which stated that "having
a smoking sector at a pub is like having a peeing sector at
a swimming pool" (Veale, 2009). The analogy promotes the
re-representation of the target situation by highlighting a set
of features that are more easily perceivable in the invented
scenario.
A relevant question raised by the present results concerns the
duration of the re-representation e ects that may arise from the
recategorization mechanism proposed herein. Going back to the
initial example of the paper, the duration of a re-representation
such as that experienced by the protagonist of "Soccer or me"
could span from lasting just a moment to exerting a long-
lasting e ect on his behavior. Eventually, a fraction of these
re-representations might end up changing the way in which
the target phenomenon gets socially represented, giving birth to
a lexicalized new concept like “soccerholism”. As proposed by
Hofstadter and Sander (2013), not only does our culture provide
us with potent concepts; it also encourages us to analogically
extend them, giving rise to completely new families of concepts
(workaholism, chocoholism, pornoholism, technoholism, etc.). On
occasions, however, the re-representation of new events in terms
of a schema-governed category will depend not only on cold
cognitive insights but also on breaking cultural resistances.
To illustrate, the recognition of sexism, ageism, speciesism or
weightism as forms of discrimination took much more than just
acknowledging a shared semantic structure across these concepts.
Despite its theoretical importance, the phenomenon of
analogical re-representation has been the subject of very little
empirical work. The present study contributes to documenting
the existence of this rather elusive phenomenon, and opens new
avenues for inquiry that depart from those traditionally proposed
in the literature.
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